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MEDOIL CORP. v. CITICORP:
UNCERTAINTY REQUIRES AN IN-




Forum-selection clauses' play an important role in interna-
tional business transactions.' The procedure of specifying a fo-
rum and a body of governing law allows the parties to negotiate
with a reasonable degree of certainty as to the costs and conve-
nience of potential litigation.3 By selecting a single forum to re-
solve disputes arising under the contract, forum-selection
clauses can also prevent jurisdictional conflicts between the
courts of nations that have personal jurisdiction over the par-
ties.4 Furthermore, such clauses allow parties to specify a partic-
ular forum that may be better suited to resolve potential dis-
putes arising under the contract.5 Finally, forum-selection
clauses help to encourage international trade and bring added
1. A forum-selection clause is a contractual provision specifying a particular forum
for litigation arising under the contract. See Gruson, Forum-Selection Clauses in Inter-
national and Interstate Commercial Agreements, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 133, 136 [herein-
after Gruson, Forum-Selection Clauses]. Courts and commentators sometimes refer to
such clauses as "jurisdiction clauses," "forum clauses," "choice-of-forum provisions," or
"consensual adjudicatory procedure." See The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S.
1, 10-15 (1972); Arsenis v. Atlantic Tankers Ltd., 240 N.Y.S.2d 69, 71 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct.
1967). Such clauses can be exclusive or nonexclusive. An exclusive clause will require
that litigation arising under the contract be brought only in the designated forum. A
nonexclusive clause allows litigation in the designated forum, but does not prohibit an,
action from being brought in another jurisdiction. See Schreiber, Appealability of a Dis-
trict Court's Denial of a Forum-Selection Clause Dismissal Motion: An Argument
Against Canceling Out The Bremen, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 463 n.3 (1988). The question
of whether the parties intended the clause to be exclusive or nonexclusive is one of con-
tract interpretation left to the court. See Gruson, Forum-Selection Clauses, supra at
133.
2. See Gruson, Governing-Law Clauses in International and Interstate Loan
Agreements - New York's Approach, 1982 U. ILL. L. REv. 207 (1988) [hereinafter
Gruson, Governing-Law Clauses]; see also Gruson, Forum-Selection Clauses, supra note
1, at 133-34.
3. Erickson, Forum Selection Clauses in Light of the Erie Doctrine and Federal
Common Law: Stewart Organization v. Ricoh Corporation, 72 MrNN L. REV. 1090, 1092-
93 (1988) [hereinafter Erickson]; see Gruson, Governing-Law Clauses, supra note 2, at
207; Gruson, Forum-Selection Clauses, supra note 1, at 133.
4. Gilbert, Choice of Forum Clauses in International and Interstate Contracts, 65
KENT L.J. 1, 2 (1976) [hereinafter Gilbert].
5. See Gilbert, supra note 4, at 3.
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stability to international business transactions, because they re-
move the uncertainty of litigating a dispute in an unknown
jurisdiction.0
Because of their important function in international busi-
ness transactions, forum-selection clauses have become very
common components of international business contracts.1 In-
creasingly, United States courts have been called upon to deter-
mine the enforceability8 of such clauses.9 In determining the en-
forceability of these clauses, courts must grapple with a host of
issues related to the contractual freedom of the parties, jurisdic-
tional principles, conflict-of-laws rules, venue choices, and forum
non conveniens defenses. 10 Notwithstanding the numerous com-
plex issues involved in the resolution of such litigation, courts in
the United States have developed a solution to the issue of the
enforceability of forum-selection clauses, and this solution has
been partially guided by the policy concerns of promoting inter-
national business transactions as well as freedom of contract.
11
Currently, United States courts view forum-selection clauses as
prima facie valid unless enforcement is shown to be unreason-
able, unjust, or in contravention to a strong United States public
policy.12
Even though the United States courts have chosen to en-
force most forum-selection clauses, the courts have "created a
6. See A. EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICT OF LAws 149, 151-52 (1962) [hereinafter
EHRENZWEIG].
7. See Gilbert, supra note 4, at 2; see generally Gruson, Forum-Selection Clauses,
supra note 1, at 133; Mullenix, Another Choice of Forum, Another Choice of Law: Con-
sensual Adjudicatory Procedure in Federal Court, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 291 (1988)
[hereinafter Mullenix].
8. This Comment uses the term "enforceability" rather than "validity." Some courts
discuss the "validity" of such clauses. Gruson, Forum-Selection Clauses, supra note 1, at
136 n.8. While a forum-selection clause may be enforceable in the contracting forum as a
proper submission to that court's jurisdiction, it may be unenforceable in an excluded
forum where the litigation was commenced in violation of the agreement. Thus, it is not
helpful to refer to a single clause as valid in one jurisdiction and invalid in another.
9. See Erickson, supra note 3, at 1091 n.9 (1988) (An October 28, 1991, WESTLAW
search of the federal courts since 1980 has revealed 265 cases concerning forum-selection
clauses).
10. See Mullenix, supra note 7, at 297.
11. This Comment will not discuss how successful the courts have been in creating
the best standard against which to judge forum-selection clauses. Instead, it will explain
the test developed by those courts, how they were applied in Medoil Corp. v. Citicorp,
729 F. Supp. 1456 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), and how the test can be clarified.
12. Gruson, Forum-Selection Clauses, supra note 1, at 148; Gilbert, supra note 4, at
24. See also The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 10 (1972); Bense v. Inter-
state Battery System of America, Inc., 683 F.2d 718, 720 (2d Cir. 1982).
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hodgepodge of principles and rationales to justify the doctrine"
that does little to clarify the theoretical problems associated
with these consensual adjudicatory practices.' 3 Long established
principles of due process and jurisdiction have been replaced by
contract principles and judicial economy.'4 Despite the theoreti-
cal shortcomings of forum-selection clause justification, United
States courts and many legal scholars still view the doctrine as a
benefit to the international business community. 5
Since forum-selection clauses serve the policy function of
promoting international business transactions, the contracting
parties must have a clear standard by which to measure pro-
posed forum-selection clauses.' e A clear standard will enable the
contracting parties to determine if a proposed forum-selection
clause would be enforced in a noncontractual forum in the
United States, thereby enabling the parties to draft more pre-
dictable contracts. The absence of a well-defined forum-selection
clause enforceability doctrine, coupled with the necessity for es-
tablishing a uniform standard for measuring forum-selection liti-
gation, requires that United States courts make an in-depth in-
quiry into the issues involved in forum-selection clause
enforceability, especially the policy implications of a decision.
17
Recently, the United States District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of New York (Southern District) handed down a decision
that does not include an in-depth discussion of the forum-selec-
tion clause issues. In Medoil Corp. v. Citicorp,' the Southern
District may have overlooked strong United States public policy
concerns when it enforced a forum-selection clause. Although
the court may have reached the correct decision, it failed to
13. See Mullenix, supra note 7, at 302. This Comment will not discuss how success-
ful the courts have been in addressing all the theoretical issues associated with forum-
selection and governing-law clause enforceability, but will explain the analysis employed
by United States courts, and how it was applied in Medoil Corp. v. Citicorp, 729 F.
Supp. 1456.
14. Mullenix, supra note 7, at 303.
15. Aside from achieving certainty, stability, and encouraging trade in the interna-
tional business community, such clauses are a benefit to the courts because they serve
the important function of docket clearing. See generally Gruson, Forum-Selection
Clauses, supra note 1; Gruson, Governing-Law Clauses, supra note 2; Gilbert, supra
note 4.
16. See Gruson, Forum-Selection Clauses, supra note 1, at 133; Gilbert, supra note
4, at 3.
17. See generally Mullenix, supra note 7, at 352.
18. Since the claim was based on an alleged violation of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, and occurred in Switzerland, the court should have discussed the law's extrater-
ritorral application. See 729 F. Supp. 1456 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
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comment on the extraterritorial application of United States se-
curities law,19 and the impact of the Mitsubishi v. Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth2 0 case.
This Comment will discuss the current analysis employed
by the United States federal courts concerning the enforceability
of forum-selection clauses in international litigation and analyze
the decision of the Southern District in Medoil Corp. v. Cit-
icorp2  in light of prior case law. Part II summarizes the recent
history of forum-selection clause enforceability, paying close at-
tention to The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co.,22 the leading
United States Supreme Court decision in forum-selection clause
litigation. Part III presents a discussion of the decision of the
Southern District in Medoil Corp. v. Citicorp,23 focusing on the
court's public policy analysis. Part IV analyzes that decision
with respect to the extraterritorial application of United States
securities law and the Supreme Court decision in Mitsubishi v.
Soler Chrysler-Plymouth.24 This Comment concludes with a rec-
ommendation that in deciding forum-selection clause enforce-
ability issues, the United States district courts make a more
probing inquiry into the interests of each forum, the likelihood
of just adjudication in a given contractual forum, and the over-
riding policy concerns of the United States. Only in this way will
the doctrine of forum-selection enforceability continue to benefit
the international business community.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Enforceability of Forum-Selection Clauses: The Reasona-
bleness Test
Forum-selection clauses have two clearly defined effects.20
One effect, known as prorogation, is an affirmative grant or re-
ceipt of a particular jurisdiction by the parties.28 The second ef-
fect, known as derogation, occurs when a court of competent
jurisdiction refuses to entertain a suit because the parties have
19. 15 U.S.C. § 78a-78o (1988).
20. 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
21. 729 F. Supp. 1456.
22. 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
23. 729 F. Supp. 1456.
24. 473 U.S. 614.
25. Gilbert, supra note 4, at 5.
26. Gilbert, supra note 4, at 5.
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contracted to litigate in another jurisdiction. Historically,
United States courts usually did not discuss forum-selection
clauses in terms of prorogation or derogation effects. 2s However,
in the past, most federal courts willingly accepted the idea of
prorogation agreements while rejecting clauses in their deroga-
tive effect.2" The courts viewed prorogation agreements as a
"generally accepted rule . . . that a court which is otherwise
competent may exercise jurisdiction bestowed upon it by the
parties' consent before or after the cause of action accrues." 30
Derogation agreements caused the most difficulty for the courts
because they were viewed as "ousting" the court of its jurisdic-
tion, although this view is no longer accepted.31 It has been
stated that the real issue in such litigation is whether courts will
enforce a forum-selection clause in their derogative effect; that
is, whether courts "will refuse to entertain a suit brought in vio-
lation of the clause even though they have personal jurisdiction
over the defendant."32 Currently, United States courts find few
problems with the derogative effects of a forum-selection clause,
and thus normally choose to enforce them.33
Prior to 1955 United States federal courts usually refused to
enforce forum-selection clauses in their derogative effect.
3 4
Courts refused to allow the contracting parties to "oust" the ju-
risdiction of the court for numerous reasons. First, without ex-
planation, courts viewed the clauses as contrary to public pol-
icy. 5 The public policy argument might stem from the fact that
most forum-selection clauses appeared in adhesion contracts and
therefore seemed to be the product of unequal bargaining
27. See Gilbert, supra note 4, at 5-7; Mullenix, supra note 7, at 330; Gruson, Forum-
Selection Clauses, supra note 1, at 136.
28. Mullenix, supra note 7, at 330.
29. Gilbert, supra note 4, at 8; Mullenix, supra note 7, at 330.
30. Gilbert, supra note 4, at 6 (citing National Equipment Rental v. Szukhent, 375
U.S. 311 (1964) (prior consent)); Adam v. Saenger, 303 U.S. 59 (1938) (consent rendered
after cause of action accrues); Mullenix, supra note 7, at 330-31.
31. Gilbert, supra note 4, at 6.
32. Reese, The Contractual Forum: Situation in the United States, 13 AM. J. Comp.
L. 187 (1964) [hereinafter Reese].
33. Mullenix, supra note 7, at 331.
34. Gruson, Forum-Selection Clauses, supra note 1, at 138. See United Fuel Gas
Co. v. Columbian Fuel, 165 F.2d 746, 749 (4th Cir. 1948) (dictum); Mutual Reserve Fund
Life Ass'n v. Cleveland Wollen Mills, 82 F. 508, 510 (6th Cir. 1897); The Ciamo, 58 F.
Supp. 65, 66-67 (E.D. Pa. 1944); The Edam, 27 F. Supp. 8, (S.D.N.Y. 1938).
35. Gruson, Forum-Selection Clauses, supra note 1, at 139. See, e.g., Meacham v.
Jamestown, F. & C.R.R. Co., 211 N.Y. 346, 354, 105 N.E. 653, 656 (1914) (Cardozo, J.,
concurring), overruled, Seigel v. Lewis, 40 N.Y.2d 687, 358 N.E.2d 800 (1976).
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power. 6 Second, United States courts were hesitant to force a
domiciliary to litigate a dispute in a foreign forum. 7 This may
stem from a parochial view of the competency and ability of
United States courts to settle disputes involving its citizens.
Third, such clauses were seen to be antithetical to the autonomy
of the courts.38 Courts held that contracting parties could not
decrease the jurisdiction of the courts that had been established
by law. 9 The clauses were believed to be related to the law of
remedies, and .therefore could not be altered by private agree-
ments. 0 However, the reasoning underlying each court's decision
was most likely an amalgam of the above mentioned explana-
tions, as well as others.41
The trend of refusing to enforce forum-selection clauses be-
gan to decline in 1949 when, in a concurring opinion in Krenger
v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co.,4 2 Judge Learned Hand wrote that he
believed forum-selection clauses were invalid only when deemed
unreasonable.4 3 Judge Hand agreed with the view of the Restate-
ment of Contracts, which used a contractual interpretation ap-
proach that looked to the relative bargaining strength of the
parties, the negotiations surrounding the contract, and the fair-
ness of enforcing the provision." Contemporaneous with Judge
Hand's opinion were an increasing number of scholarly works
that were critical of the court's refusal to enforce forum-selec-
tion clauses.45
In 1951 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (Second
Circuit) upheld a forum-selection clause in a bill of lading con-
ferring jurisdiction on the Norwegian courts in Cerro de Pasco
Copper Corp. v. Knut Knutsen.46 In Cerro de Pasco, the court
36. Gilbert, supra note 4, at 9.
37. Gilbert, supra note 4, at 9; see also EHRENZWEIG supra note 6, at 150; Reese,
supra note 32, at 188.
38. See Erickson, supra note 3, at 1094; see also Carbon Black Export v. The S.S.
Monrosa, 254 F.2d 297, 300-01 (5th .Cir. 1958), cert. dismissed, 359 U.S. 180 (1959).
39. Gruson, Forum-Selection Clauses, supra note 1, at 139.
40. Gruson, Forum-Selection Clauses, supra note 1, at 139; see, e.g., Meacham v.
Jamestown, F. & C.R.R. Co., 211 N.Y. 346, 352, 105 N.E. 653, 655 (1914) (Cardozo, J.,
concurring), overruled, Seigel v. Lewis, 40 N.Y.2d 687, 358 N.E.2d 484 (1976).
41. See Gilbert, supra note 4, at 9.
42. 174 F.2d 556 (2d Cir. 1949).
43. See Farquharson, Choice of Forum Clauses - A Brief Survey of Anglo-Ameri-
can Law, 8 INT'L LAWYER 83, 95 (1974) [hereinafter Farquharson].
44. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRAcTs § 558 (1932).
45. See Farquharson, supra note 43, at 96.
46. 187 F.2d 990 (2d Cir. 1951).
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found that the United States had no connection with the dispute
and subsequently held that the district court was within its dis-
cretion to dismiss the suit on forum non conveniens grounds.
47
Further, the court determined that the forum-selection clause
was not unreasonable and upheld the decision of the Norwegian
courts.48 In a concurring opinion Judge Clark based his decision
on the validity of the forum-selection clause rather than on a
forum non conveniens analysis.4
In a similar case, the Second Circuit employed a reasonable-
ness test in upholding a forum-selection clause conferring juris-
diction on a foreign court.50 Win. H. Muller & Co. v. Swedish
American Line Ltd. concerned a bill of lading that conferred ju-
risdiction on the Swedish courts over disputes arising under the
contract."1 In Muller, the plaintiff brought suit in the Southern
District of New York when cargo it had shipped on the defend-
ant's vessel was lost at sea.52 The plaintiff claimed that enforce-
ment of the forum-selection clause would be contrary to the Car-
riage of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA),53 since COGSA declares
void clauses that lessen a carrier's liability for damages incurred
during shipment of goods.54 In upholding the forum-selection
clause, the court employed a reasonableness test, utilizing five
factors in its decision: (1) ownership of the vessel; (2) nationality
of the crew; (3) whether the chosen court would apply the same
measure of damages as the current forum; (4) whether the cho-
sen forum's limitation proceedings would be more restrictive;
and (5) the likelihood of fair and just adjudication of the
dispute. 5
This new trend in forum-selection clause enforcement was
short-lived. In 1967, aspects of the Muller decision were over-
47. Id. at 991.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Win. H. Muller & Co. v. Swedish American Line Ltd., 224 F.2d 806 (2d Cir.
1955); see Gilbert, supra note 4, at 16; Farquharson, supra note 43, at 96; Gruson, Fo-
rum-Selection Clauses, supra note 1, at 142.
51. 224 F.2d at 807.
52. Id.
53. Id. 46 U.S.C. §§ 1300-15 (1970). The Carriage of Goods by Sea Act renders void
any contractual provisions designed to lessen the liability of a carrier of goods over the
high seas. See also Gilbert, supra note 4, at 16.
54. Medoil Corp. v. Citicorp, 729 F. Supp. 1456 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). 46 U.S.C. § 1303(8)
(1970); see also Gilbert, supra note 4, at 16.
55. 224 F.2d at 808.
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ruled in Indussa Corp. v. S.S. Ranborg.5 6 In Indussa, the Second
Circuit held that a clause similar to that in Muller did in fact
lessen the liability of a carrier in contravention of COGSA and
was therefore void as against public policy.57 Although this deci-
sion did not specifically overturn the application of the reasona-
bleness test, it brought into question the enforceability of such
clauses."8
B. The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co.
By 1972, although a majority of United States courts still
embraced the common law approach to forum-selection enforce-
ability, utilization of the reasonableness test in enforcing forum-
selection clauses had become a somewhat persuasive and in-
creasingly popular minority position."9 It was at this time that
the United States Supreme Court adopted the reasonableness
approach in the landmark decision of The Bremen v. Zapata
Off-Shore Co.6 0 Although The Bremen specifically addressed fo-
rum-selection clauses in admiralty cases, it is viewed as an au-
thority for the use of the reasonableness test in all forum-selec-
tion clause litigation.6'
The dispute in The Bremen concerned an international tow-
age contract between a German corporation, Unterweser
Reederei (Unterweser), and a United States corporation, the
Zapata Off-Shore Company (Zapata). 2 Unterweser agreed to
tow Zapata's ocean-going drilling rig Chaparral from Louisiana
56. 377 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1967). See also Farquharson, supra note 43, at 97; Gilbert,
supra note 4, at 16-17.
57. Indussa, 377 F.2d at 204; see also Gruson, Forum-Selection Clauses, supra note
1, at 140 n.26.
58. See Gilbert, supra note 4, at 17; Gruson, Forum-Selection Clauses, supra note
1, at 140 n.26.
59. See Gilbert, supra note 4, at 24.
60. 407 U.S. 1 (1972) (specifically adopting a reasonableness approach to forum-se-
lection clause enforceability in admiralty cases).
61. See generally Gruson, Forum-Selection Clauses, supra note 1, at 149 n.58 (when
the Supreme Court stated that the decision in The Bremen should be read along with
the decision in National Equipment Rental v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311 (1964), the court
implied that the reasonableness test should not be limited to admiralty cases.); The
Bremen, 407 U.S. at 10. See also In re Fireman's Fund Ins. Cos., 588 F.2d 93, 95 (5th
Cir. 1979); In-Flight Devices Corp. v. Van Dusen Air, Inc., 466 F.2d 220, 234 n.24 (6th
Cir. 1972) (dictum) ("[a]lthough the Supreme Court decision came in the context of a
choice between a forum in this country and one in England, the principles announced in
it would seem equally applicable to domestic choice of forum questions.")
62. The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 2.
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to location in the Adriatic Sea. The towage contract, submitted
by Unterweser, contained a forum-selection clause which re-
quired that, "any dispute arising [under the contract] must be
treated before the London Court of Justice. '64 The contract also
contained two exculpatory clauses purporting to release Un-
terweser from liability for damages resulting from the voyage.65
Despite the forum-selection clause Zapata then brought suit
in the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Florida alleging negligence and breach of contract after the
Chaparral had been severely damaged in a storm. Unterweser
moved to dismiss the action based on the forum-selection clause
and on the grounds of forum non conveniens, or in the alterna-
tive to stay the action pending submission to the High Court of
Justice.6 Zapata also moved to have the district court enjoin
Unterweser from pursuing the action in the High Court of
Justice.'
The district court denied Unterweser's motion to dismiss
based on the forum-selection clause, resting its decision on the
traditional common law view that such clauses were against pub-
lic policy. The court also granted Zapata's motion to enjoin
Unterweser fron" proceeding in the action in the High Court of
Justice. ° A divided Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit (Fifth
Circuit) affirmed the decision of the district court, and later
adopted it on a hearing en banc, with six judges dissenting.71
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Zapata executives reviewed the contract and made several changes, but left both
the forum-selection and exculpatory clauses unaltered. Id. at 3. A Zapata vice-president
then executed the contract and forwarded it to Unterweser in Germany, where it was
accepted as amended, and the contract became effective. Id.
66. Zapata then instructed the Bremen to tow the rig to the nearby port of Tampa,
Florida. 407 U.S. at 3. Zapata brought suit against Unterweser in personam, and the
Bremen in rem, seeking $3.5 million in damages alleging negligence and breach of con-
tract. 407 U.S. at 4.
67. Before the district court ruled on its motion, Unterweser brought an action
before the High Court of Justice in London claiming breach of contract. Zapata made a
special appearance to contest jurisdiction, but was rejected then, and also on appeal.
Unterweser filed an action to limit its liability to Zapata and other potential claimants in
the district court in Tampa. 407 U.S. at 4 & 5 n.4.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 6-7. The court also rejected Unterweser's forum non conveniens argument.
70. Id.
71. The majority of both courts based their decisions on the reasoning of Carbon
Black Export, Inc. v. The Monrossa, 254 F.2d 297 (5th Cir. 1958), concluding that the
High Court of Justice would not be a more convenient forum than the district court in
Southern Florida. See The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 7. Carbon Black stood for the proposi-
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Subsequently, the Supreme Court, in an eight to one deci-
sion, vacated the judgment of the Fifth Circuit, stating "that far
too little weight and effect were given to the [forum-selection]
clause in resolving" the controversy between Unterweser and
Zapata. 2 The Supreme Court held the correct approach in fo-
rum-selection clause litigation to be that such clauses are prima
facie valid and should be enforced unless the defending party
can "clearly show that enforcement would be unreasonable and
unjust, or that the clause [is] invalid for such reasons as fraud or
overreaching. ' 73 In its decision, the Court relied heavily on pol-
icy concerns such as the current expansion of the international
business markets and the emerging pro-enforceability attitude in
the United States legal community, 74 including many United
States courts.75 The Court also explicitly rejected the traditional
"ousting" of jurisdiction view as nothing more than a vestigial
legal fiction."6
In deciding the issue of reasonableness, the Court advanced
several factors to be considered in forum-selection clause litiga-
tion.7 First, courts should consider whether the contract was
freely negotiated between parties possessing business experi-
ence.78 Second, courts must examine the record for evidence of
undue influence, overreaching, or fraud.79 Third, the neutrality
of the contractual forum should also be taken into account.80
Fourth, courts should include in this analysis whether enforce-
tion that a forum-selection clause will not be enforced unless thee selected jurisdiction
would provide for a more convenient forum than the state in which the suit was brought.
This is basically a forum non conveniens analysis. See Carbon Black, 254 F.2d 297.
72. The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 8.
73. Id. at 15.
74. As evidence of this proposition Chief Justice Burger cited the following: RE-
STATEMENT (SEcoND) OF THE CONFLICT OF LAws § 80 (1971); Reese, supra note 32;
EHRENZWEIG, supra note 6, at § 41; the MODEL CHOICE OF FoRum ACT (National Confer-
ence of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 1968).
75. The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 10. In footnote 11 of the Supreme Court opinion, Chief
Justice Berger cited the following cases as evidence of the minority trend of forum-selec-
tion clause enforceability: Central Contracting Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 367 F.2d
341 (3d Cir. 1966); Anastasiadis v. S.S. Little John, 346 F.2d 281 (5th Cir. 1965) (by
implication); Wm. H. Muller & Co. v. Swedish American Line Ltd., 224 F.2d 806 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 903 (1955); Cerro de Pasco Copper Corp. v. Knut Knutsen,
O.A.S., 187 F.2d 990 (2d Cir. 1951).
76. The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 12.
77. See Gilbert, supra note 4, at 27.




MEDOIL CORP. v. CITICORP
ment of the clause would be seriously inconvenient for the trial
of the action;8l that is, would one party effectively be denied a
meaningful day in court.8 2 Finally, the Court concluded that
such clauses should not be enforced if they would contravene a
strong public policy. s3 The decision in The Bremen heralded the
new era of the reasonableness test in enforcing forum-selection
clauses.84
C. Expansion of the Reasonableness Test After The Bremen
The reasonableness test was first viewed as a two-pronged
test for the enforceability of forum-selection clauses.8 5 The first
prong of the test was to determine whether the clause was void
or voidable under the common-law contract principles of fraud
or overreaching.8 " The second prong examined if enforcement
would be unfair, unjust, or unreasonable.8 " However, the factors
in examining each of the prongs overlapped, and therefore a sep-
arate analysis of the factors was not useful.88 Thus, the two-
prong test was eventually abandoned by a majority of the courts
in favor of an aggregate approach whereby courts look to all the
factors of The Bremen test in determining the "reasonableness"
of the forum-selection clause. 9
Subsequent to the Supreme Court's decision in The
Bremen, federal courts have held that the reasonableness test is
not limited to admiralty cases or to cases involving an agreement
to litigate in a foreign forum.90 The policy motivations behind
the reasonableness test have been employed in cases dealing
81. Id. at 16.
82. Id. at 18-19; see Gilbert, supra note 4, at 28.
83. The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 15-16; see Gilbert, supra note 4, at 25-26.
84. See Gilbert, supra note 4, at 29; Gruson, Forum-Selection Clauses, supra note
1, at 147-49.
85. See Mullenix, supra note 7, at 356-57; Gruson, Forum-Selection Clauses, supra
note 1, at 163.
86. See Mullenix, supra note 7, at 357; Gruson, Forum-Selection Clauses, supra
note 1, at 163.
87. See Mullenix, supra note 7, at 357; Gruson, Forum-Selection Clauses, supra
note 1, at 163.
88. See Mullenix, supra note 7, at 357; Gruson, Forum-Selection Clauses, supra
note 1, at 164.
89. See Mullenix, supra note 7, at 357. For cases supporting this proposition, see
Mullenix, supra note 7, at 293 n.3.
90. Gruson, Forum-Selection Clauses, supra note 1, at 149. See Crown Beverage
Co., Inc. v. Cerveceria Moctezuma S.A., 663 F.2d 886, 888 (9th Cir. 1981); City of New
York v. Pullman, Inc., 477 F. Supp. 438, 441 n.10 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Gaskin v. Stum
Handel GmbH, 390 F. Supp. 361, 363 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
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with interstate agreements, arbitration agreements, and gov-
erning-law clauses.91 Although The Bremen enunciated only
three areas where a forum-selection clause may be held unen-
forceable, courts have broadened the test to include other condi-
tions under which a party seeking to maintain an action in con-
travention of a forum-selection clause may support its claim.
92
These defenses can be divided into the following categories: (1)
litigation in the contractual forum will present substantial in-
convenience to the party; (2) the plaintiff will be denied an ef-
fective remedy; (3) the forum-selection clause is unconscionable;
(4) there are statutory restrictions on the forum-selection clause;
or (5) enforcement would contravene a strong public policy.
3
Even though these defenses can be divided into separate groups,
the elements of proof are often interrelated, and a plaintiff may
attempt to prove more than one defense.94 And although courts
will discuss the reasons for refusing to enforce such clauses in
different ways, the rationales generally fits into one of the above
mentioned categories.
95
When parties bring an action in violation of a forum-selec-
tion clause claiming that litigating the dispute in the contractual
forum will be gravely inconvenient, they will have a difficult
time convincing the court of such a proposition. Since there is
a presumption that consideration was given in choosing the con-
tractual forum, 97 courts believe that the parties should get what
they bargained for unless there is a showing that a trial in the
contractual forum will be gravely inconvenient.9 Due to this
91. See Gilbert, supra note 4, at 30-35; Mullenix, supra note 7, at 315-21; Gruson,
Forum-Selection Clauses, supra note 1, at 149-50.
92. See Gilbert, supra note 4, at 32.
93. See Gilbert, supra note 4, at 32-66; Gruson, Forum-Selection Clauses, supra
note 1, at 164-85.
94. See Karl Koch Erecting Co. v. New York Convention Center Dev. Corp., 838
F.2d 656, 658-59 (2d Cir. 1988); Bense v. Interstate Battery Sys., 638 F.2d 719-22 (2d Cir.
1982); Medoil Corp. v. Citicorp, 729 F. Supp. 1456, 1458-61 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); Dukane
Fabrics Int'l, Inc. v. Hreljin, M.V., 600 F. Supp. 202 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
95. See Gilbert, supra note 4, at 32-66; Gruson, Forum-Selection Clauses, supra
note 1, at 163-85; see also Mullenix, supra note 7, at 358 (discussing the decision of
D'Antuono v. CCH Computax Sys., 570 F. Supp. 708 (D.R.I. 1983) which attempted to
list the factors of The Bremen test that had been discussed by the federal courts).
96. See generally Gilbert, supra note 4, at 32 (there is a presumption "that consid-
eration was received at the time of contracting for the alleged inconvenience," and the
court will not entertain the suit unless it is otherwise unfair.) See also Gruson, Forum-
Selection Clauses, supra note 1, at 182.
97. See Gilbert, supra note 4, at 32.
98. The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 16 (1972).
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presumption, the defense of inconvenience has become substan-
tially more difficult to prove than it was under prior case law,
which analyzed the claim under traditional forum non con-
veniens principles.""
A second defense to the enforcement of a forum-selection
clause is that it would deprive the plaintiff of an effective rem-
edy.100 In analyzing such a claim, courts carefully evaluate the
chosen forum to see if it would be a fair forum for both par-
ties.101 The Court in The Bremen stressed that the contractual
forum was neutral as well as experienced in admiralty litigation,
and consequently found that it would be a fair forum to litigate
the claim.0 2 The requirement of neutrality of the chosen forum
"will be met if the courts of the selected country are impartial,
independent, free from prejudice against foreigners, and not
subject to influence by one of the parties or the local govern-
ment." 103 Other factors courts will examine are the substantive
law to be applied by the contractual forum, the measure of dam-
ages allowed by statute or judicial decision, whether the action
would be unduly restricted, and the general potential for just
adjudication.1
0 4
A third defense to the enforcement of a forum-selection
clause is that it would be unconscionable. 0 5 In deciding on a
claim of unconscionability, courts consider such factors as fraud,
duress, misrepresentation, the bargaining relationship between
the parties, and other unconscionability factors used in contract
law.106 The issue of unconscionability of the clause will be ad-
dressed by courts with respect to the forum-selection clause it-
self, not the entire contract. 0 7 For example, the Supreme Court
99. See Gruson, Forum-Selection Clauses, supra note 1, at 183. For a discussion of
cases decided under the inconvenience rationale, see Gruson, Forum-Selection Clauses,
supra note 1, at 179-82 & 179-82 n.200-14.
100. Gilbert, supra note 4, at 34; see Gruson, Forum-Selection Clauses, supra note
1, at 167.
101. See Gruson, Forum-Selection Clauses, supra note 1, at 167.
102. The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 12.
103. Gruson, Forum-Selection Clauses, supra note 1, at 169.
104. See Gilbert, supra note 4, at 38. For a discussion of cases dealing with the
denial of an effective remedy, see Gruson, Forum-Selection Clauses, supra note 1, at
167-69 & 167-69 n.142-53; Gilbert, supra note 4, at 34-35 & 34-35 n.189-97.
105. Gilbert, supra note 4, at 38. See Gruson, Forum-Selection Clauses, supra note
1, at 170-85.
106. See Gruson, Forum-Selection Clauses, supra note 1, at 165-67; Gilbert, supra
note 4, at 36.
107. See Gruson, Forum-Selection Clauses, supra note 1, at 165.
1991] 699,
BROOKLYN J. INT'L L.
in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co.,108 referring to the fraud excep-
tion in The Bremen, stated that:
This qualification does not mean that any time a dispute aris-
ing out of a transaction is based upon an allegation of fraud
... the clause is unenforceable. Rather, it means that [a] ...
forum-selection clause in a contract is not enforceable if the
inclusion of that clause in the contract was the product of
fraud or coercion. 109
Therefore, if the contract itself was bargained for in good faith,
but the forum-selection clause was included as a result of fraud,
duress, or any other unconscionable means, courts will refuse to
enforce that clause and will entertain the suit.110
A fourth possibility for supporting an action brought in vio-
lation of a forum-selection clause is when enforcement would vi-
olate a specific statute of the excluded forum."1 For example,
The Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA), 12 provides that
an action may be brought under the act in any of three fora:
federal district courts or state courts in the district of the de-
fendant's residence; the district in which the cause arose; or the
district in which the defendant was doing business at the time of
the commencement of the action.1 ' An agreement between an
employer and employee that limits the employee's right to bring
suit in any eligible forum under FELA would be held unenforce-
able, and the court in which the suit was brought would be
forced to entertain the action.1"4 This rationale is closely related
to the public policy exception discussed below, and the courts
often refer to them together.
Finally, the most important aspect of The Bremen was the
Supreme Court's recognition of the public policy concerns of the
excluded forum.115 The Supreme Court stated that a contractual
108. 417 U.S. 506 (1974). Cf. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388
U.S. 395 (1976) (holding the opposite for an arbitration clause).
109. Scherk, 417 U.S. at 519 n.14 (emphasis in original).
110. See Gruson, Forum-Selection Clauses, supra note 1, at 165.
111. See Gruson, Forum-Selection Clauses, supra note 1, at 173-74.
112. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1957) The Federal Employers' Liability Act was enacted to
protect workers in interstate activities against certain job related injuries by making the
employer liable.
113. Id.
114. For a full discussion, see Gruson, Forum-Selection Clauses, supra note 1, at
174.
115. See generally Gilbert, supra note 4, at 43-66 (the extended discussion of the
public policy exception is evidence of its importance relative to the other aspects of The
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forum-selection clause would be unenforceable if enforcement
would contravene a strong public policy of the excluded fo-
rum.116 The court recognized that many forum-selection clauses
are coupled with a choice-of-law provision specifying that any
litigation under the contract will be decided under the laws of
the chosen forum.'" Furthermore, even if there is no such provi-
sion, the selected forum will often use its own conflict-of-laws
rules and decide to resolve the dispute under its laws anyway.118
Deciding an action using a materially different law from the ex-
cluded forum would violate the interests of that forum."'
For a party to be successful in claiming the public policy
exception to enforceability, it must prove that the contractual
forum's substantive or procedural law is in violation of a strong
public policy of the excluded forum, whether statutory or judi-
cial. 20 In order to prove a violation of a strong public policy, the
party claiming the exception must first be able to show that the
transaction giving rise to the dispute bears a relation to the ex-
cluded forum.' 2' For example, if two non-New York parties
agree to resolve all disputes arising under their contract in the
courts of Italy, and the transaction giving rise to the dispute oc-
curred in New York, the New York courts will examine Italian
law for a violation of a strong New York public policy. 22 Then,
if Italian law does so contravene New York public policy, the
New York courts would have a reason to entertain an action
brought in violation of the forum-selection clause. 2 3
In analyzing the relation of the transaction to the excluded
forum and the public policy exception generally, courts will take
into account the following factors: (1) the domicile, nationality,
residence, and principle place of business of the party bringing
suit; (2) the domicile, nationality, residence, and principle place
Bremen reasonableness test).
116. The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 15 (1972).
117. The Bremen, 407 U.S. 1; see Gilbert, supra note 4, at 43.
118. See Gilbert, supra note 4, at 43; Gruson, Forum-Selection Clauses, supra note
1, at 170 n.156.
119. See Gilbert, supra note 4, at 39.
120. 407 U.S. at 15 ("[a] contractual choice-of-forum clause should be held unen-
forceable if enforcement would contravene a strong public policy of the forum in which
suit is brought, whether declared by statute or by judicial decision.")
121. See Gruson, Forum-Selection Clauses, supra note 1, at 171.
122. See Gruson, Forum-Selection Clauses, supra note 1, at 171. However, the
courts have not discussed how significant the relationship has to be between the transac-
tion and the excluded forum for the court to apply the public policy exception. Id.
123. See Gruson, Forum-Selection Clauses, supra note 1, at 171.
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of business of the party defending the action; (3) the location of
the transactions involved in the contract, including the place of
negotiation, signing, and performance; (4) the location of the al-
leged breach of contract, or where the dispute arose; (5) the gov-
ernmental interests of the chosen forum; and (6) the governmen-
tal interests of the excluded forum.124 Although the impetus
behind the forum-selection clause enforceability doctrine is in
part the policy concerns of the United States, federal courts very
often fail to adequately address these issues and thus fail to fur-
ther refine the doctrine.
III. IEDOIL CORP. V. CITICORP
A. Facts
On March 5, 1986, Medoil Corporation (Medoil), a Liberian
shipping company with its sole place of business in Connecti-
cut,125 opened an account with Citicorp Investment Bank Swit-
zerland (CIBS), a Swiss corporation owned and controlled by
Citicorp, a multinational financial institution.' 26 The account
was negotiated and opened in Zurich, Switzerland by Mr.
Evangelos Karvounis, the President of Medoil, and one of the
two owners of Medoil. 27 The business relationship between
Medoil and CIBS was covered by the following agreements: (1)
an account agreement; (2) an agreement governing fiduciary
placements under which CIBS was authorized to make place-
ments at Medoil's direction using funds from the account; (3) a
margin agreement under which CIBS would extend a line of
credit to Medoil; and (4) a declaration of pledge, whereby
Medoil pledged $500,000 to CIBS.12s The account agreement of-
fered several investments and services for customers to select
from. 29 One of the services offered was "Safekeeping Accounts
and Securities Transactions," which authorized CIBS to take
124. See Gilbert, supra note 4, at 45.
125. Medoil Corporation (Medoil) is a shipping company that conducts business
with West African oil producers. It is incorporated under the laws of Liberia, and has a
registered office in Monrovia. The company is owned by Medoil (USA) which has its sole
place of business in Greenwich, Connecticut. The only shareholders of Medoil (USA) are
Mr. Evangelos Karvounis and his wife Theodora. See Medoil Corp. v. Citicorp, 729 F.
Supp. 1456, 1457-58 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. See Memorandum of Law of Defendant Citicorp in Support of Its Motion to
Dismiss the Complaint, at 5 [hereinafter Defendant's Memorandum].
129. Medoil, 729 F. Supp. at 1458.
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custody of the securities and make transactions on the ac-
count.13 0 Mr. Karvounis did not select this service for Medoil's
account.131
Subsequently, a dispute arose between Medoil and CIBS
over the alleged fraudulent sale of securities. The alleged fraud-
ulent transactions concerned the purchases of stock in Clark
Copy International Corporation (Clark).3 2 Clark was offering
approximately five million shares of common stock at $3.00 per
share."'33 Since the shares were being offered without registration
under the Securities Exchange Act of 1933, they were required
to be sold to non-United States residents or citizens. 34 Medoil
contended that financial information and the Offering Memo-
randum were concealed from it because the information con-
tained in these documents was "extremely negative and . . . to-
tally inconsistent" with the information given by CIBS'
personnel. 35 The December 2, 1986, Offering Memorandum that
was concealed from Medoil contained the following statement in
bold uppercase letters: "These securities involve a high degree of
risk . . . Investors must be persons who are neither United
States of America residents nor . . . citizens, whether residing in
the U.S.A. or abroad."' 3 6 Although these transactions were al-
leged to be fraudulent, they were authorized by Mr. Karvounis,
and Medoil subsequently purchased approximately 270,000
shares of stock in Clark.
37
A situation concerning alleged fraudulent securities transac-
tions is governed by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Ex-
change Act).'38 In July 'of 1989 Medoil Corporation filed suit
against Citicorp in the Southern District of New York, seeking
compensatory and punitive damages under the Exchange Act, 3 '
the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. See Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, at
13 [hereinafter Plaintiff's Memorandum].
133. Plaintiff's Memorandum, supra note 132.
134. See Plaintiff's Exhibits 1 Through 23, exhibit 7, at ii-1 [hereinafter Plaintiff's
Exhibits].
135. Plaintiff's Memorandum, supra note 132, at 14.
136. Plaintiff's Exhibits, supra note 134, at exhibit 10.
137. See Reply Memorandum of Law of Defendant Citicorp in Support of its Mo-
tion to Dismiss the Complaint, exhibit 7, at 1.
138. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78o (1988).
139. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78o (1988).
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Act), 140 as well as other pendent state claims. 141 The complaint
alleged that the funds Medoil had deposited in its account with
Citicorp were used to make unauthorized stock transactions and
that Medoil purchased shares of stock in Clark while relying on
the false statements and misleading omissions of CIBS employ-
ees. 142 Pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 143 Cit-
icorp moved to dismiss the complaint based on a forum-selection
clause it had with Medoil that provided:
All relations between the Bank and the Account Holder(s) are
governed by Swiss law. Place of performance, place of prosecu-
tion for debts and exclusive venue for all legal actions are the
location of the Bank's office appearing on this Agreement re-
gardless of the Account Holder(s)'s residence or domicile. The
Bank, however, may bring action against the Account
Holder(s) before the courts of any other competent authority
at the place of residence of the Account Holder(s) or elsewhere,
in which case Swiss law will also govern and be applied.' 4'
B. The Court's Decision
In applying the reasonableness test of The Bremen, the dis-
trict court found that enforcement of the forum-selection clause
in the account agreement would not be unreasonable, gravely in-
convenient, or against public policy, and therefore dismissed
Medoil's complaint. 145 First, the court reasoned that although
Medoil did not initial the "Safekeeping" provision on the ac-
count agreement authorizing CIBS to 'make securities transac-
tions on its account, the action arose out of the relationship cre-
ated when the parties signed the forms containing the forum-
selection clause. 4 ' Medoil used the account to make several
140. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1988).
141. Medoil Corp. v. Citicorp, 729 F. Supp. 1456, 1458 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
142. Id.
143. Citicorp moved to dismiss under rules 12(b)(3), for improper venue, and
12(b)(6), for failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted. See FED. R. Civ. P.
12 (b)(3) & (b)(6). A motion to dismiss based on a forum-selection clause is considered a
motion to dismiss for lack of proper venue. Medoil, 729 F. Supp. at 1457 n.1.
144. Id. at 1457. The Margin and Fiduciary Agreements, and the Declaration of
Pledge contained the following clause: "The Applicable law and jurisdiction will be gov-
erned by the Account Agreement, which is known to and has been accepted by the Ac-
count Holder(s) as governing the Account Holder(s)'s business relationship with the
Bank." Id. at 1457-58.
145. Id. at 1459-61.
146. Id. at 1458.
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transactions within two weeks after it was opened and even au-
thorized some of the alleged fraudulent transactions.147 There-
fore, the court held that the forum-selection clause was applica-
ble to the dispute.148
Second, the court found that enforcement of the clause
would not be unreasonable even though there were no negotia-
tions, and even though the clause limited only Medoil's choice of
forum.'49 Relying on another Second Circuit case, the court con-
cluded that "mere absence of negotiation over the terms of a
contract does not render a forum-selection clause unenforce-
able."1 " Thus, the court rejected Medoil's argument that forum-
selection clauses limiting only one party's choice of forum are
unreasonable.151
In addressing the issue of inconvenience, the court stated
that enforcement of the clause would not be unreasonable.' 52
Satisfying the burden of proving inconvenience requires a show-
ing that litigation in the contractual forum would be so gravely
inconvenient that the plaintiff would essentially be deprived of
its day in court. 53 The court stated that Swiss courts are a fair
forum for resolution of disputes, and given Mr. Karvounis' trips
to Switzerland to negotiate the account, the contractual forum
was not gravely inconvenient.
1 54
Finally, the court decided that enforcement of the clause
would not contravene a strong public policy of the forum.155 The
court stated that the public policy of enforcing the antifraud
provisions of the Exchange Act would not be offended if the
clause was enforced, basing its opinion on the interests of the
contractual forum and of the Southern District. 56 In reaching
this decision, the court looked to the residence of the respective
litigants and the location of the negotiations and transactions,
and decided that the Southern District did not have a meaning-
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 1458-59.
150. Id. at 1458 (citing Karl Koch Erecting Co. v. New York Convention Center
Dev. Corp., 838 F.2d 656, 659 (2d Cir. 1988).
151. Id. at 1459-60.
152. Id. at 1460.
153. Id. (citing Schertenleib v. Traum, 589 F.2d 1156, 1164-66 (2d Cir. 1978) (Swit-
zerland provides alternative forum under the forum non conveniens doctrine)).
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. (citing AVC Nederland B.V. v. Atrium Inv. Partnership, 740 F.2d 148 (2d
Cir. 1984) as an example).
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ful connection to the suit.157 The court reasoned that since Swit-
zerland is a center of international banking and financial ser-
vices and "the foreign elements of the transaction [were]
sufficiently meaningful to require enforcement of the forum-se-
lection clause, it has a substantial interest in resolving the
dispute." '158
C. Discussion
As the district court held, Medoil must carry the burden of
proof in demonstrating that the forum-selection clause should
not be enforced as such clauses are prima facie valid and should
be enforced unless shown to be unreasonable under the circum-
stances.'59 Medoil's arguments supporting its claim of "unrea-
sonableness" did not have enough strength to support the heavy
burden to which it must be held. 60 In analyzing the decision of
Medoil Corp. v. Citicorp, it is first essential to discuss the plain-
tiff's claims of unequal bargaining power and the nonmutuality
of the forum-selection clause. Second, the public policy and day
in court arguments must be evaluated.
1. Forum-Selection Clause as Unreasonable
Relying in part on a Second Circuit decision, Judge Stanton
wrote that Medoil was "apparently experienced in international
transactions" and freely chose to enter into an agreement limit-
ing its choice of forum for any disputes that might arise under
the contract."6" In deciding the issue of the alleged unequal bar-
gaining position of Medoil and CIBS, the court correctly con-
cluded that the parties were on an equal level.6 2 The court
placed a great deal of emphasis on the fact that Medoil was in
the business of international oil shipping.16 3 Indeed, Medoil con-
ducted business in at least six West African countries, and its
president, Mr. Karvounis, had a personal business relationship
157. Id.
158. Id.; see generally Defendant's Memorandum, supra note 128, at 9-11, 16-17.
159. Medoil Corp. v. Citicorp, 729 F. Supp. 1456, 1459 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
160. Id. at 1459-60.
161. Id. at 1459 (citing Bense v. Interstate Battery Sys., 683 F.2d 718, 722 (2d Cir.
1982) (forum-selection clause bound plaintiff because it "was part of the bargain into
which he freely entered.")).
162. See id. at 1459.
163. Id.
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with Citicorp for over thirteen years.6 Also, Mr. Karvounis
traveled to Switzerland to open the account, which is evidence
that he initiated the business relationship. 165 Furthermore, al-
though Medoil could have opened an account in the United
States, it chose not to. 66 The aforementioned factors are evi-
dence that Medoil was an experienced business entity. There-
fore, Medoil was unable to prove that Citicorp was in such a
superior bargaining position that the forum-selection clause was
unreasonable and thus unenforceable.
Similarly, the court correctly rejected Medoil's arguments
that the nonmutuality of the forum-selection clause and the ab-
sence of any negotiation required that the clause be held unen-
forceable.'6 7 Medoil's argument, that the clause limited only its
choice of forum and should therefore be found unreasonable, is
totally misplaced. Medoil based its argument on an extension of
a New York rule invalidating nonmutual arbitration agree-
ments, 66 relying on the analogy of arbitration agreements to fo-
rum-selection clauses. 69 However, by the time of Medoil's com-
plaint, this rule had been overturned by the New York Court of
Appeals.17 0 Moreover, even when in effect, this rule had not been
extended to cover nonmutual forum-selection clauses.' 7
Medoil's argument urging a finding of unenforceability due
to lack of negotiations is also without merit. Medoil based its
argument on a reading of the Supreme Court's decision in The
Bremen that is misplaced. More specifically, Medoil argued that
The Bremen requires enforceability only when the clause is
164. See Plaintiffs Memorandum, supra note 132, at 10; Defendant's Memoran-
dum, supra note 128, at 14-15.
165. See Medoil Corp. v. Citicorp, 729 F. Supp. at 1459 (the context within which
this is discussed is evidence that the court thought it not to be a case of solicitation of an
unsophisticated individual by a large corporation.); see also Defendant's Memorandum,
supra note 128, at 14.
166. Medoil, 729 F. Supp. at 1459.
167. Id. at 1459-60.
168. The New York rule declared void any nonmutual arbitration agreements;
agreements that required only one party to bring any claims to arbitration rather than to
sue. See Karl Koch Erecting Co. v. New York Convention Ctr. Dev. Corp., 838 F.2d 656,
659-60 (2d Cir. 1988); Cored Panels, Inc. v. Meinhard Commercial Corp., 420 N.Y.S.2d
731 (App. Div. 1979); Firedoor Corp. of America, Inc. v. R.K. & A. Jones, Inc., 366
N.Y.S.2d 443 (App. Div. 1975).
169. See Scherk v. Alberto-Culver, 417 U.S. 506, 519 (1974) (held an agreement to
arbitrate before a special tribunal is, in effect, a kind of forum-selection clause).
170. See Sablosky v. Gordon Co., 73 N.Y.2d 133, 538 N.Y.S.2d 513, 535 N.E.2d 643
(N.Y. 1989) (overruled the New York rule against nonmutual clauses).
171. See Karl Koch Erecting,-838 F.2d at 659-60.
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"freely negotiated [and] bargained for [during] an arm's-length
negotiation by experienced and sophisticated businessmen.
'17 2
Medoil claimed that "the [a]ccount [a]greement was a boiler-
plate contract of adhesion.' 17 Although such a reading is techni-
cally correct, courts in the Southern District have "consistently
found that is not unreasonable to enforce a forum provision em-
bodied within a standard printed [contract]. Accepting
Medoil's argument without more specific proof of overreaching
would be to hold void all forum-selection clauses in standard
printed contracts.1 75 The mere fact that the forum-selection
clause was not specifically negotiated for is not of great concern;
instead, the focus should be on whether the entire contract was
formed by experienced businessmen.
2. Medoil's Day in Court And Public Policy Arguments
A joint discussion of Medoil's public policy claims and its
claims of being denied its day in court is logical since the latter
is often discussed tangentially as an "oblique [way] of saying
that the law which the chosen forum would probably apply
would oppose a strong public policy of the nonchosen forum. ' 176
Medoil claimed that by forcing it to litigate this dispute in Swit-
zerland, the court denied it the right to pursue its claim under
the antifraud provision of the Exchange Act.177 Although Medoil
conceded that recovery under this theory is possible in the Swiss
courts, it argued that it is highly unlikely that it will be able to
recover, and argued that even if it did recover, such recovery will
be drastically less than it would be in the United States. 7 8
Medoil based its argument in part on the requirement in Swiss
law of proof of a level of fraud approaching criminal conduct to
172. Plaintiff's Memorandum, supra note 132, at 22; see also The Bremen v. Zapata
Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 10-14 (1972).
173. Plaintiff's Memorandum, supra note 132, at 22.
174. Dukane Fabrics Int'l v. Hreljin, M.V., 600 F. Supp. 202, 203 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)
(citing Galaxy Export Corp. v. M/V Hektor, 1983 A.M.C. 2637, 2639 (S.D.N.Y. 1983)).
175. See Paterson, Zochonis (U.K.) Ltd. v. Compania United Arrows, S.A., 493 F.
Supp. 626, 630 n.14 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
176. Gilbert, supra note 4, at 43.
177. See Plaintiff's Memorandum, supra note 132, at 27.
178. See Plaintiff's Memorandum, supra note 132, at 27. Medoil based its argument
on a letter written by Mr. Francis Hogskin, Esq., a Swiss attorney who "consider[s] it
most unlikely that [Medoil] would be able to prove either an illegal action or breach of
contract by the bank. Even if this were possible, the claim to damages would be reduced
drastically because the fault would seem as largely the customer's own." Plaintiff's Ex-
hibits, supra note 134, exhibit 21, at 3.
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entitle a plaintiff to recovery.17e
Forum-selection clauses are not unreasonable simply be-
cause they require a plaintiff to bring an action in a forum
whose law or procedure is less favorable to it than the United
States.8 0 However, Medoil augmented its day in court argument
with the strong public policy of the United States in protecting
private investors in the securities markets. 81 Citing the Fifth
Circuit decision in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver,8 2 Medoil argued
that: "Congress conceived that securities are 'intricate merchan-
dise,' and that the public interest demanded legislation which
would recognize the gross inequality of bargaining power be-
tween the professionals in the securities business and the aver-
age investor."''8 3
Medoil proposed another policy argument in support of
maintaining the action in the Southern District. Medoil argued
that allowing a multinational corporation like Citicorp to evade
the United States securities laws through its corporate structure
and a forum-selection clause, thereby allowing a foreign office to
"solicit and consummate in the United States the sale of an
American security [to] an American Citizen," would be against
the policy of the Exchange Act. 84 In essence, according to
Medoil, this would turn the United States securities market into
a "Barbary Coast" for international securities pirates by al-
lowing foreign securities brokers to fraudulently promote securi-
ties and then claim solace within the forum-selection clause in
the contract,8 5
179. See Plaintiff's Memorandum, supra note 132, at 27; Plaintiff's Exhibits, supra
note 134, exhibit 21, at 2.
180. Medoil Corp. v. Citicorp, 729 F. Supp. 1456, 1460 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (citing
Karlberg European Tanspa, Inc. v. JK-Joseph Hratz Vertriebsgesellschaft mbH, 618 F.
Supp. 344, 348-49 (N.D. Ill. 1985); Dukane Fabrics Int'l, 600 F. Supp. 202, 204 (S.D.N.Y.
1985)).
181. See Plaintiff's Memorandum, supra note 132, at 32. In support of its claim,
Medoil cites: 78 CONG. REc. 1934 (remarks of Sen. Fletcher); 4 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
THE SEcuRrms AcT OF 1933 AND SECURTIES ACT OF 1934, 2270 (J. Ellenberger & E.
Maher Eds. 1973); Williams v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 753 F.2d 117, 120 (D.C. Cir. 1985)
(Congress recognized inequality of bargaining power between buyers and sellers); Charles
Hughes & Co. v. SEC, 139 F.2d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 786 (1943)
("essential objective of securities legislation is to protect those who do not know market
conditions from the overreachings of those who do.").
182. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver, 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
183. See Plaintiff's Memorandum, supra note 132, at 32.
184. See Plaintiff's Memorandum, supra note 132, at 32.
185. See Plaintiff's Memorandum, supra note 132, at 32 (citing SEC v. Kassar, 548
F.2d at 116 (3d Cir. 1977)).
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The district court separately answered each of Medoil's
claims.186 With regard to the day-in-court argument, the court
stated that Medoil must show that Switzerland is so difficult a
forum that it will "essentially be deprived of its day in court,"
18 7
and not that the laws of the forum are less favorable than in the
United States.""" The court then went on to cite numerous deci-
sions where other courts held that the Swiss courts were a fair
and reasonable forum for the resolution of disputes. 18 9 Further-
more, the court pointed out that Mr. Karvounis had made nu-
merous trips to Switzerland to set up the account and that an-
other trip to litigate the dispute would not be "extraordinarily
inconvenient." 90
With respect to Medoil's public policy argument, the court
answered by citing AVC Nederland B.V. v. Atrium Inv. Part-
nership,9' a Second Circuit case that enforced a forum-selection
clause in an action under section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, and
Fustok v. Banque Populaire Suisse, 92 a Southern District case
that applied a forum non conveniens analysis to an action under
the Commodity Exchange Act. In AVC Nederland, the Second
Circuit found the foreign elements of the transactions "suffi-
ciently meaningful to require enforcement of the forum-selection
clause," even though it was highly unlikely that the Swiss courts
would apply the Exchange Act.19 3 Similarly, the Medoil court
found that the ties to Switzerland were sufficient to dismiss the
action based on the forum-selection clause.
94
IV. ANAYSIS
The district court's discussion of Medoil's claims of unequal
186. Medoil Corp. v. Citicorp, 729 F. Supp. 1456, 1460 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
187. Id. See also Diatronics, Inc. v. Elbit Computers, Ltd., 649 F. Supp. 122, 126
(S.D.N.Y. 1986), aff'd 812 F.2d 712 (2d Cir. 1987); Paterson, Zochonis (U.K.) Ltd. v.
Compania United Arrows, S.A., 493 F. Supp. 626, 630 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
188. Medoil, 729 F. Supp. at 1460.
189. Id. (citing Schertenleib v. Traum, 589 F.2d 1156, 1164-66 (2d Cir. 1978)); Ras-
kin S.A. v. Datasonic Corp., No. 86-C7596, 1987 WL 8180 (N.D. Ill. 1987). Both cases
hold that the Swiss courts are a fair forum for the resolution of disputes concerning
United States citizens.
190. Id.
191. Id. (citing AVC Nederland B.V. v. Atrium Inv. Partnership, 740 F.2d 148, 149
(2d Cir. 1984)).
192. Id. at 1460-61 (citing Fustok v. Banque Populaire Suisse, 546 F. Supp. 506,
513-14 (S.D.N.Y. 1982)).
193. Id. at 1460.
194. Id.
[Vol. XVII:3
MEDOIL CORP. v. CITICORP
bargaining power and nonmutuality of the forum-selection
clause is directly on point, and the court was correct in dis-
missing the suit.19 5 However, the district court's opinion is void
of an in-depth discussion of the United States policy concerns
underlying the forum-selection clause dismissal. 196 Since such
discussions are necessary to clarify the remaining uncertainty in-
volving the doctrine of forum-selection clause enforceability,
Medoil adds little to the progeny of The Bremen v. Zapata Off-
Shore Co.
197
At least two possibilities exist in discussing the policy be-
hind the doctrine of forum-selection clause enforceability. One
possible discussion involves an interpretation of the Supreme
Court decision in Mitsubishi v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth,9 and
another involves an analysis of the extraterritorial application of
the SEC Act.199
A. Mitsubishi v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth
Reliance on A VC Nederland B. V. and Fustok in responding
to Medoil's public policy argument is not soundly based. Not
only does Fustok concern claims arising under a different sub-
stantive law of the United States, 00 but both cases are factually
distinct from Medoil. Furthermore, persuasive dictum to the
contrary exists in the Supreme Court decision of Mitsubishi Mo-
tors v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth.20 ' In Mitsubishi, Justice Black-
mun wrote: "[In] the event [that] the choice-of-forum and
choice-of-law clauses operated in tandem as a prospective waiver
of a party's right to pursue statutory remedies for antitrust vio-
lations, we would have little hesitation in condemning the agree-
ment as against public policy. 12 02 Although this discussion ap-
pears in a footnote, its language is straightforward and
persuasive, and it is clear that the Court recognized the public
policy concerns of the United States under the Sherman Anti-
trust Act.20 ' Furthermore, the decision was five to three,204 Jus-
195. Id. at 1461.
196. See id. at 1459-61.
197. The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
198. Mitsubishi v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
199. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78o; 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68.
200. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 10(b) (1988) and 7 U.S.C. § 1 (1936) with 15 U.S.C. 78a-
78o (1988).
201. 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
202. Id. at 637 n.19.
203. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1890).
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tices Stevens, Brennan, and Marshall voted to hold the forum-
selection clause unenforceable as against public policy. 05 The
language and concern of the Supreme Court can be extended to
cover claims under the Exchange Act, especially in light of the
current recessionary atmosphere and the Court's interest in pro-
tecting United States securities purchasers. Since the forum-se-
lection clause in Medoil is coupled with a choice-of-law provi-
sion, it is highly likely that the two would work in tandem as a
prospective waiver of Medoil's right to pursue a claim under the
Exchange Act.20 6 Had this case been decided by the Supreme
Court, a different outcome might have occurred.
On the other hand, the Southern District may have decided
the issue of enforceability correctly. Medoil, a Liberian shipping
company, has its sole place of business in Greenwich, Connecti-
cut, and its only shareholders are two United States citizens. 7
Since a Liberian corporation is the plaintiff in this action,
Medoil is not factually analogous to Mitsubishi, where the plain-
tiff was a United States corporation .20 The dictum in Mitsub-
ishi is unclear on whether the possibility of nonenforcement is
only open to United States citizens, residents, or both. 09 It may
be the case that the Supreme Court would not protect Medoil
from the forum-selection and choice-of-law clauses because
Medoil is a Liberian corporation, with its only substantial con-
nection to the United States being its office in Connecticut. Al-
lowing Medoil to seek refuge in an expanded reading of the Mit-
subishi dictum may not comport with the policy justifications
for not enforcing a forum-selection and choice-of-law clause in
an international securities agreement. By incorporating in Libe-
ria, Medoil sought to avail itself of the benefits of the local West
African shipping markets and to escape from the more restric-
tive laws of the United States. In effect, Medoil would be given
the benefit of both worlds if it were allowed to challenge en-
forceability under these circumstances. Indeed, Medoil would be
able to avail itself of the benefits of the Liberian incorporation,
and to escape the grasp of United States corporate laws, while at
204. Justice Powell took no part in the decision.
205. 473 U.S. at 640.
206. See Plaintiff's Memorandum, supra note 132, at 27; Plaintiff's Exhibits, supra
note 134, exhibit 21, at 3.
207. Medoil Corp. v. Citicorp, 729 F. Supp. 1456, 1457 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
208. 473 U.S. at 617.
209. Id. at 637, n.19.
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the same time receiving the benefits of the policies behind the
antifraud provisions of the Exchange Act. Whatever the out-
come, some of the remaining uncertainty concerning the forum-
selection clause enforceability doctrine could have been elimi-
nated had the district court discussed 1) the effect of the dictum
in Mitsubishi on the Medoil dispute, and 2) whether the doc-
trine should be extended to foreign corporations with offices in
the United States, as well as to United States citizens.
B. The Extraterritorial Application of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934
Since the Medoil dispute was between a Liberian plaintiff
and Swiss defendant, and the alleged fraudulent conduct oc-
curred in Switzerland, deciding the case on the merits would in-
volve the extraterritorial application of the Exchange Act. 210 The
extraterritorial application of these laws involve numerous pol-
icy issues including comity, bases of jurisdiction, and conflict-of-
law analysis.211 In examining such issues, courts often rely on the
Restatement (Third) The Foreign Relations Law of the United
States (Restatement (Third)). 21 2 The drafters of the Restate-
ment (Third) were guided by policy concerns similar to those
raised by the forum-selection clause enforceability doctrine
when they developed their rules for the extraterritorial applica-
tion of United States law. These concerns include international
comity, protection of the United States territorial sovereignty,
and lessening concurrent jurisdictional problems. 13 In resolving
the forum-selection clause enforceability issue in Medoil, the
district court should have discussed the Restatement (Third)
and the policy issues related to the jurisdiction to prescribe the
Exchange Act in order to further define the scope of the forum-
selection clause enforceability doctrine.
With respect to Medoil's claims under the Exchange Act,
the district court should have pointed out that, under the Re-
210. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §§
403, 416 (1987). See also Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597 (9th
Cir. 1976). Medoil's pendent state claims are not addressed by this Comment. Also,
Medoil's claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act would be
treated the same as its claims under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
211. See Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 615.
212. See id. at 608-12.
213. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
403 cmt. a, § 416 cmt. a (1987).
1991] 713
BROOKLYN J. INTL L.
statement (Third), the Exchange Act would probably not have
been applied to the dispute. 14 In deciding this issue, a court
may turn to section 416 of the Restatement (Third), entitled Ju-
risdiction to Regulate Activities Related to Securities. Section
416(1) contemplates securities activities occurring totally or
predominantly within the United States and is therefore not ap-
plicable to Medoil.2 15 However, section 416(2) deals with activi-
ties that occur outside the United States, and may be applied by
United States courts to disputes similar to Medoil. Section
416(2) states:
Whether the United States may exercise jurisdiction to pre-
scribe with respect to transactions or conduct other than those
addressed in Subsection (1) depends on whether such exercise
of jurisdiction is reasonable in light of § 403, in particular...
(c) whether the party sought to be subjected to the jurisdiction
of the United States is a United States national or resident, or
the persons to be protected are United States nationals or
residents.21
Section 403(2) states: "[w]hether exercise of jurisdiction over a
person or activity is unreasonable is determined by evaluating
all relevant factors, including. . . ," and then lists eight factors
which should be evaluated by the court.21 7 The factors include:
the link between the activity and the regulating state; the con-
nections between the regulating state and the person responsible
for the activity; the extent to which another state may have an
interest in regulating the activity; the likelihood of conflict with
regulation of another state; and the importance of regulating the
activity to the regulating state.2 18 By discussing the impact of
the Restatement (Third), the district court could have helped to
refine and clarify the forum-selection clause enforceability
doctrine.
In deciding the issue of the extraterritorial application of
the Exchange Act, the district court would most likely have con-
cluded that the dispute should not be governed by the Act.21 9
Section 416(2)(c) centers on the links of nationality and resi-
214. See id. § 416.
215. Id. § 416(1).
216. Id. § 416(2).
217. Id. § 403(2).
218. Id.
219. See id. §§ 416(2)(b), 403(2).
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dence of the parties, in line with section 403(2)(b).220 Since the
alleged fraudulent activity occurred entirely within Switzerland,
there were no territorial links with the United States. Also, the
conduct was committed by a Swiss national against a Liberian
corporation. 221 Therefore, the application of the Exchange Act
would be unreasonable in light of section 416(2)(c) and section
403(2).
The argument against enforcing the Exchange Act in the
Medoil dispute is further buttressed by the Reporters' note fol-
lowing section 416(2)(b).222 The Reporters' wrote:
Whether exercise of regulatory jurisdiction by the United
States is justified in order to protect residents of the United
States against actions taken outside the country depends on
the circumstances. For instance, a resident of the United
States who deliberately traveled to Canada to trade in Cana-
dian securities . . . should not be entitled to the protection of
the United States law in an action against his Canadian ven-
dor/lender.223
Since the fact pattern in Medoil is similar to the example given
in the Reporters' note to section 416, it cannot be denied that
Reporters' intended not to apply the Exchange Act to situations
such as this. In fact, the Reporters' comment is even more re-
strictive because it mentions a resident of the United States who
is an individual, not a corporation as is the case with Medoil.
Although the district court reached the correct decision in
dismissing the suit due to the forum-selection clause, a discus-
sion of the extraterritorial application of the Exchange Act
would have served to better define the scope of the forum-selec-
tion clause enforceability doctrine. By discussing such issues the
federal courts would send a clear message concerning the policy
reasons for refusing to enforce such clauses. With this message,
the international business community will be better able to draft
more certain contracts and to avoid potential conflicting juris-
dictional problems.
220. Id. 416(2)(c) reporter's note 2.
221. Medoil Corp. v. Citicorp, 729 F. Supp. 1456, 1457-58 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
222. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
416 reporter's note 2.
223. Id. (citing Kook v. Crang, 182 F. Supp. 388 (S.D.N.Y. 1960)).
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V. RECOMMENDATIONS
If the forum-selection clause enforceability doctrine is to
continue to benefit the international business community and
the courts, the doctrine must necessarily be more clearly de-
fined. A clearly defined doctrine will allow both the international
business community and the courts to take full advantage of its
benefits. The necessity for establishing a clear standard against
which to measure forum-selection clause litigation requires the
lower courts to make more probing inquiries into the interests of
each forum, the likelihood of just adjudication in the contractual
forum, and the overriding policy concerns of the United States.
The needs of certainty, stability, and the encouragement of in-
ternational trade are compelling, but they should not outshadow
the equally compelling public policy concerns of the United
States. Allowing the prima facie validity of these clauses to reign
supreme may have the reverse effect than that imagined in The
Bremen.
Ramon E. Reyes, Jr.
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